13 ideas
18696 | The vagueness of truthmaker claims makes it easier to run anti-realist arguments [Button] |
18701 | The coherence theory says truth is coherence of thoughts, and not about objects [Button] |
10304 | Very few things in set theory remain valid in intuitionist mathematics [Bernays] |
18694 | Permutation Theorem: any theory with a decent model has lots of models [Button] |
10303 | Restricted Platonism is just an ideal projection of a domain of thought [Bernays] |
10306 | Mathematical abstraction just goes in a different direction from logic [Bernays] |
18692 | Realists believe in independent objects, correspondence, and fallibility of all theories [Button] |
18693 | Indeterminacy arguments say if a theory can be made true, it has multiple versions [Button] |
18695 | An ideal theory can't be wholly false, because its consistency implies a true model [Button] |
18700 | Cartesian scepticism doubts what is true; Kantian scepticism doubts that it is sayable [Button] |
18698 | Predictions give the 'content' of theories, which can then be 'equivalent' or 'adequate' [Button] |
18697 | A sentence's truth conditions are all the situations where it would be true [Button] |
7517 | I could take a healthy infant and train it up to be any type of specialist I choose [Watson,JB] |